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Abstract
We present a dynamic model of endogenous interest group sizes and poli-
cymaking. Our model integrates ’top-down’ (policy) and ’bottom-up’ (behav-
ioral) in‡uences on the development of interest groups. We show that, for
example an increase in the contribution by members of an interest group need
not induce larger subsidies to that group, even though it would in case of …xed
interest group sizes. This is due to a political participation e¤ect, next to a re-
distribution e¤ect. On the other hand, the dynamic analysis of the model shows
that reliance on equilibrium results such as these can be misleading since equi-
libria may not be stable. In fact, complicated dynamics may emerge leading to
erratic and path dependent time patterns for policy and interest group sizes.
We demonstrate that our model can endogenously generate the types of spurts
and declines in organizational density that are observed in empirical studies.
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JEL classification: D23; D72; D78; E32; H30
1 Introduction
Interest groups play an important role in economic policymaking. Many empirical
studies show this for Europe and the U.S. (Richardson 1994, Potters and Sloof 1996).
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1According to Richardson (p 11-12) the following observation by the Norwegian polit-
ical scientist Stein Rokkan captures the practical essence of European democracy:
the crucial decisions on economic policy are rarely taken in the parties or
in Parliament: the central area is the bargaining table where the government
authorities meet directly with the trade union leaders, the representatives of the
farmers, the smallholder and the …shermen, and the delegates of the Employers’
Association. These yearly rounds of negotiations have in fact come to mean
more in the lives of rank-and-…le citizens than formal elections.
Theoretically, the importance of this phenomenon is re‡ected in the studies of Mancur
Olson on collective action (Olson 1965, 1982) and the upsurge of endogenous economic
policy models concentrating on the interaction between interest groups and economic
policymakers (van Winden 1999). Although these models have provided interesting
new insights into the determinants of economic policies, their relevance is restricted in
several ways. By focusing on equilibria of a properly de…ned game with interest groups
of …xed size and the government as (essentially completely informed and fully rational)
players, they do not provide an explanation of the development of interest groups,
nor do they look into the dynamics of the interaction between the players and allow
for incomplete information and (boundedly rational) adaptive behavior in a complex
environment. In reality, the relations between government and interest groups are
inherently dynamic, as testi…ed by the country studies collected by Richardson (1994).
Timely examples are provided by the increasing participation of environmentalists
and health groups in the development of agricultural policies, the changing political
landscape concerning tobacco, and the recent upsurge in NGOs that are increasingly
being co-opted into policymaking (The Economist 1999). On a more aggregate level,
the ‡uctuations in the percentage of unionized workers in the U.S. may serve as an
illustration. According to Freeman (1997, p. 8) the sudden spurts in union density





















Figure 1: Time series of the density of union membership in the U.S., 1880-1995
2On the other hand, the time-series Freeman (1988, p. 69) presents re-
garding the development of union densities in di¤erent countries show that the pattern
of these ‡uctuations over time is very diverse, with some countries facing increases
while others are experiencing declines. He concludes that this constitutes powerful
evidence against, or at least casts doubt on, broad explanations (such as unions hav-
ing become obsolete in modern market economies), structuralist arguments (pointing
at changes in the composition of the work force), or general macroeconomic expla-
nations (referring to the oil shock, for instance). Freeman (1997) distinguishes two
types of models that can generate spurts in union growth. The …rst are standard
comparative statics linear models in which exogenous shocks (usually generated by
political forces, like laws) generate responses in otherwise stable union membership.
The second are models in which the growth process creates non-linearities producing
‘phase transitions’ when certain conditions are met (models of self-organized complex-
ity). Without denying the importance of political ‘top-down’ changes as triggers for
the growth process, Freeman’s study of the development of union density in the U.S.
focuses on and argues in favor of the second type of (‘bottom-up’) models; these mod-
els stress “the underlying process by which organization occurs and the cumulative
behavior of individual workers, unions, and …rms. (...) the behavior of thousands or
millions of individuals acting in response to one another” (p. 9). The above examples
concerning agriculture, the tobacco industry, and NGOs suggest that this ‘bottom-
up’ approach is also important for an analysis of the development and in‡uence of
other interest groups.
In this paper we take a …rst shot at explicitly modeling the dynamics of interest
group size and the interaction between interest groups and governmental policymak-
ing, focusing on redistribution. The advantage of a theoretical model is that one can
focus on important aspects without having to bother about data limitations or vio-
lations of ceteris paribus assumptions that empirical analyses are generally plagued
with (see e.g. Neumann and Rissman 1984). For tractability, we develop a simple
model consisting of three essential parts: one determining the individual propensity
for collective action, another determining the organizational density of an interest
group, and a third generating government policy. Because the (redistribution) policy
feeds back into the other two parts of the model, the ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’
approaches distinguished above are integrated in one model. Both the dynamics and
the comparative statics of this model are investigated.
One of the main results is that the process of interest group development may
inhibit the occurrence of a stable political economic equilibrium, leading to com-
plicated dynamics in the interaction between the organization of social groups and
governmental policymaking. Di¤erent types of ‡uctuations in the organizational den-
sities of the interest groups, as well as in the tax rate for redistribution, are observed
for di¤erent choices of the behavioral parameter values. Regular ‡uctuations of short
or long length, or short ‡uctuations superimposed on long ones, are obtained, where
densities ‘mirror’ or ‘follow’ each other. But also (highly) irregular patterns show up.
3Time series like exhibited by Figure 1 - with sudden spurts and sharp declines - may
occur. The model o¤ers an endogenous mechanism causing these time patterns, in
which both ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ factors play a role. Furthermore, it is noted
that our model is not restricted to the interaction between workers/unions and em-
ployers. It, more generally, refers to social groups with con‡icting economic interests
and with a potential in‡uence on government policies (like workers versus capitalists,
age-groups, industries within an economic sector, and so on).
Our analysis clearly shows the restrictiveness of the common assumption of …xed
sized interest groups in endogenous policy models. It turns out that the innocence
of such an assumption very much depends on the nature and state of the behavioral
mechanisms (think of the occurrence of sudden spurts). The comparative-statics
analysis, furthermore, helps explain why union leaders are critical of income inequality
and why they may have reservations concerning social welfare policies (cf. Neumann
and Rissman 1984). This analysis also addresses the impact of demographic and
sectorial shifts.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Comparative statics are addressed in Section 3, while Section 4 goes into the dynamic
features of the model. A concluding discussion is o¤ered in Section 5.
2 The model
For convenience, our model focuses on two economic sectors, A and B, each employing
a large number of agents. All individuals in sector i(= A;B) are endowed with an
income wi. There is no mobility between sectors and the number of agents in each
sector is exogenously given as mi: Furthermore, all individuals are assumed to have
the same indirect utility function V (y), for which we make the following standard
assumptions: V (y) ¸ 0, V (0) = 0, V 0 (y) > 0, V 00 (y) < 0 and limy!0V 0 (y) = 1.
We assume that the government can redistribute income by levying a, possibly
negative, lump-sum tax of ¿A on the individuals in sector A; which implies a lump-
sum subsidy to the individuals in sector B equal to ¿B = ¡
mA
mB¿A, in order to balance
the government budget.
Individuals in each sector can organize into an interest group which entails a given
contribution ci per individual. The contribution fee leads to a reservation value r(ci),
with r0 (ci) > 0 and r (0) = 0. This reservation value can be seen as the monetary
equivalent of the e¤ort expended in the collective action of the interest group. For
individual j (j = 1;::: ;mi) in sector i indirect utility equals V (wi ¡ ¿i ¡ r(cj)),
where cj = ci (i = A;B) for interest group members and cj = 0 for the non-members.
Collective action of the interest groups consists of lobbying for a tax schedule that
favors both the members and the non-members in the respective sector. The group-
speci…c public good (bad) nature of the tax schedule introduces a free-riding problem,
which is characteristic for many types of interest groups.
4We …rst provide a simple model for the development of interest groups (a micro-
foundation is provided in Appendix A). The model consists of two submodels: one
determining the individual propensity to join an interest group and another deter-
mining the size (membership) of the interest group. Assuming bounded rationality,
the propensity of an individual to join is related to the gap between actual utility and
a reference utility level. Because the cost of a contribution will be mentally traded
o¤ against the threat of a positive tax, it seems natural to take as reference utility
level V (wi ¡ r(ci)), which materializes if participation in collective action leads to
the absence of a tax. This implies that people are expected to be more inclined to
join the interest group the more the reservation value (i.e. the required e¤ort cost)
falls short of the tax they have to pay under the current regime. More speci…cally,
for each of the individuals of sector i the probability of joining that sector’s interest
group is assumed to be given by a function ¤ of this gap, that is
Pr[joining]i = ¤(¯i[V (wi ¡ ¿i) ¡ V (wi ¡ r (ci))]); i = A;B;
where ¤ : I R ! (0;1) and ¤0 < 0. The parameter ¯i > 0 measures the behavioral
sensitivity to a gap between actual and reference utility. This sensitivity may be
related to cultural factors speci…c to the social group considered (e.g. a tradition of
collective action) or to limited information on how government policies impact utility,
in which case it resembles the quantal response model of McKelvey and Palfrey (1995).
Empirical evidence for the assumption that dissatisfaction with government policies
is a determinant of political participation is provided by empirical models of voter
behavior in large-scale elections where the probability of voting for an opposing party
(which can be considered as an interest group in itself) is related to the dissatisfaction
of the voter with the economic situation under the incumbent government (see e.g.
Paldam 1997).
Whether the propensity to join materializes into actual organization, or to staying
a member, will depend on several factors. Legal rights to organize, for example,
have historically played an important role in the organization of unions. Another
importantfactor concerns the ability ofinterest group leaders (political entrepreneurs)
to mobilize discontent or to maintain membership (cf. Rothemberg 1988). Here,
we assume a simple partial adjustment process for the evolution of the size of an
interest group. With probability ¸i the propensity to join is assumed to lead to
actual membership, while with probability 1 ¡ ¸i the individual stays put. Given
that there are a large number of individuals in each sector, the sizes of the interest
groups (ni) evolve deterministically as
ni;t+1 = (1 ¡ ¸i)ni;t + ¸imi¤(¯i [V (wi ¡ ¿i) ¡ V (wi ¡ r(ci))]); i = A;B: (1)
Given the contribution level, the size of the interest group next determines the total
5resources available for collective action1.
We now turn to the government. In line with the literature concerning endoge-
nous policy models, it is assumed that policymakers are interested in contributions
from interest groups and that policies are adjusted to secure these contributions (see
e.g. Becker 1983, Baron 1994, Nitzan 1994, Dixit et al. 1997; a survey is provided by
van Winden 1999). Policymakers may be motivated in this respect by, for instance,
political survival (think of campaign contributions), a need for policy relevant infor-
mation (contributions in the form of e¤ort), or greed (corruption). As a consequence,
contributions are taken to in‡uence the extent to which the interests of the social
groups are taken into account. Since our focus is not on the precise mechanism relat-
ing interest group activity to government policy, we take a reduced-form approach by
















where the weights attached to the interests of the individuals in the di¤erent sectors
are determined by the respective total contributions of the interest groups, Ci =
cini.2 For given levels of the individual contributions ci this implies that the sizes
of the interest groups ni are determinant. The tax rate that will be selected by
the government follows from the following …rst-order condition (the second-order
condition being satis…ed)
CAV









Notice that if total contributions per sector are the same (CA = CB) after-tax income
will be equalized across sectors.
An equilibrium (nA;nB;¿) of our model is implicitly given by eqs. (1) and (2).
We have
Proposition 1 For functions V (:), r(:) and ¤i (:) that satisfy the assumptions of
our model, an equilibrium (n¤
A;n¤
B;¿¤) of the model speci…ed by (1) and (2) exists and
is unique.
See Appendix B for proof.
1An alternative interpretation of the model would be that people do not decide upon whether
to join or not, but that the decision is about contributing or not contributing. Eq. (1) would
then determine the total number of contributors, and thereby the total resources available. This
interpretation would be relevant for fund raising drives, for example.
2We can also interpret this equation as the bargaining solution to a bargaining process. (cf Rees
1977).
63 Comparative statics
In this section we investigate the equilibrium e¤ects of changes in the contribution
level (c), the size of a sector (m), the income level in a sector (w), and the behavioral
sensitivity parameter (¯). Note that changes in the partial adjustment parameter (¸)
have no e¤ect on an equilibrium as it drops out of eq. (1) in an equilibrium. For
convenience, we will focus on parameter changes holding for sector A (similar e¤ects
would be obtained for sector B). Proofs of the results and explicit expressions for
the critical values mentioned in the propositions can be found in Appendix B. Before
we go into the comparative statics of the full model (as given by eqs. (1) and (2)),
let us brie‡y describe the comparative statics e¤ects of the model with …xed group
sizes, nA = nA and nB = nB. The model is then completely speci…ed by equation
(2), which determines the optimal tax rate ¿, for given sizes of the interest groups.
Proposition 2 Consider the model with …xed group sizes. An increase in the (…xed)
size of the interest group in sector A leads to a decrease in the tax rate ¿. Furthermore,
an increase in the contribution fee in sector A (cA) leads to a decrease in the tax rate
¿, while an increase in the income in sector A (wA) leads to an increase in ¿ as wel
as net of tax income. Finally, an increase in the size of sector A (mA) leads to a
decrease in the absolute value of the tax rate ¿.
There are two separate e¤ects playing a role in these comparative statics results,
which we denote the political in‡uence e¤ect and the redistribution e¤ect, respectively.
The political in‡uence e¤ect refers to the fact that an increase in political in‡uence
by one of the interest groups (as captured by its total contribution Ci) will tilt the
tax rate in favor of the sector it represents. The redistribution e¤ect sets in because,
given contribution levels, the government has a tendency to redistribute income. The
comparative statics e¤ect of a change in the group size nA or nB or of a change in the
contribution fee cA, are completely due to the political in‡uence e¤ect, whereas the
comparative statics e¤ect of a change in the size of the sector (mA) or the income in
a sector (wA) are due to the redistribution e¤ect. These comparative statics e¤ects
seem to be quite plausible. In the remainder of this section we will see that, when we
account for endogeneity of group sizes – that is, an additional participation e¤ect –
the comparative statics e¤ects may become ambiguous: for many comparative statics
e¤ects there are two regimes, one where the comparative static e¤ect is positive, and
one where it is negative.
3.1 Contribution level
The following proposition summarizes the e¤ects of an increase in the contribution
to the interest group in sector A, when group sizes are endogenous.
7Proposition 3 A higher contribution in sector A (cA) generates a lower equilibrium
value of nA. Furthermore, there exists a critical value c¤ > 0 such that for cA > c¤
an increase in cA leads to an increase in ¿ and a decrease in nB; while for cA < c¤ a
(marginal) increase in cA leads to a decrease in ¿ and an increase in nB.
Note from the proposition that the size of an interest group is always negatively
a¤ected by an increase in the contribution level. If this were not the case, the increased
size of the interest group (nA in this case) should be accompanied by a higher tax
rate for the sector involved (see eq.(2)), which leads to a contradiction, because in
the case at hand CA would increase whereas CB decreases (because nB is negatively
a¤ected by the tax increase).
The tax rate, on the other hand, may be lower (higher) for this sector joint with
a bigger (smaller) interest group in the other sector. The driving force here is the
e¤ect of the contribution, and the consequent e¤ect on the interest group size, on the
total contribution level of the group (CA = cAnA) which may be positively but also
negatively a¤ected. In particular, total contributions increase when
@CA
@cA




Notice that, by the argument given above, the second term in this expression is
negative, hence if cA is larger than c¤ = ¡
nA
@nA=@cA, an increase in the contribution
fee will lead to a decrease in total contributions from sector A. It is easily checked
that as long as the total resources for political in‡uence are decreased the tax rate
must go up. The increase in the tax rate will lead to a decrease in nB. If cA < c¤
total contributions will increase with an increase in the contribution fee cA and the
opposite results follow. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to endogenize
the contribution level, it may be interesting to point at a potential dilemma for the
leaders of an interest group in this context. If their main interest is in the size of the
group they may want to opt for a low contribution fee. However, if their main concern
would be the welfare of the members a higher contribution level may be warranted,
with a lower tax rate but a smaller group size. We leave this issue of collective
decision making - where also conjectures about the behavior of other interest groups
may come into play - for future research.
3.2 Size of sector
In the previous case redistribution is caused by a change in political in‡uence due
to the political participation e¤ect of the increased contribution level. When the
size of a sector changes, however, there is an immediate redistribution e¤ect with in
addition participation and in‡uence e¤ects. The reason is that, in contrast with the
contribution level, the size of a sector plays an explicit role in the interest function
that is maximized by the government. The next proposition summarizes the e¤ects
of an increase in the size of sector A.
8Proposition 4 There exist ¿a, ¿b and ¿c with ¿a < 0 < ¿b < ¿c such that ¿ increases
(decreases) with an increase in mA if and only if ¿ < ¿a(¿ > ¿a), nB increases
(decreases) with an increase in mA if and only if ¿ < ¿b (¿ > ¿b) and nA increases
(decreases) with an increase in mA if and only if ¿ < ¿c(¿ > ¿c).
First consider the e¤ect of an increase in mA on the equilibrium tax rate ¿. We know
from Proposition 2, that for …xed group sizes the redistribution e¤ect will decrease
the absolute value of the tax rate and hence drive the tax rate to 0. If ¿A = ¿ is
positive, the increased size of sector A leads to a larger tax base which makes it
possible to increase the after-tax welfare of both social groups by decreasing ¿A as
well as ¿B = ¡
mA
mB¿. If ¿A is negative, this tax (and thereby ¿B) goes up to equalize
weighted after-tax welfare, because the bigger size of sector A puts a larger burden
on sector B in that case. With endogenous group sizes the situation is a little more
complicated because of the political in‡uence e¤ect. An increase in the size of sector
A might increase the size of the interest group in sector A, which might lead to a
decrease in the tax rate, even if it is already negative. Hence the tax rate will be
driven in the direction of ¿a < 0.
Now consider the e¤ect on the group sizes. First consider the group in sector B.
The only e¤ect of mA on the size of this group goes through the e¤ect of the tax rate.
In fact, if total taxes from group A, mA¿, increase, then after-tax income in group B
will increase and hence the group size will decrease. This happens for ¿ > ¿b, where
¿b is the unique solution to
@ (mA¿)
@mA




Obviously, ¿b = 2 (¿a;0) and in fact ¿b > 0. Finally, consider the size of the group
in sector A. Here, there are two e¤ects. The direct e¤ect on group A is that a
larger sector leads to a bigger interest group, through the participation function,
nA = mA¤A. There is also an indirect e¤ect via the tax rate ¿. That is, the total
e¤ect can be described by
@nA
@mA






where the …rst component corresponds to the direct e¤ect, which is always positive,
and the second component corresponds to the indirect e¤ect, the sign of which is
equal to the sign of @¿
@mA and hence ambiguous. If the indirect e¤ect is negative
and su¢ciently strong the group in sector A might indeed decrease as the sector
increases. This happens for ¿ > ¿c. Thus, a change in the size of a sector - e.g.
because of technological developments, migration, or changes in the age structure of
the population - may have very di¤erent e¤ects dependent on the initial distribution
of the tax burden and the political in‡uence e¤ects.
93.3 Income level
An increase in the income level of a sector – due to technological or international
economic developments, for example – induces redistribution from that sector to
the other sector, for given political in‡uence weights. However, it also a¤ects the
political participation of that sector, and thereby its political in‡uence. The results
summarized in the following proposition depend on the net outcome of these two
forces.
Proposition 5 Let 4V 0
A ´ V 0 (wA ¡ ¿) ¡ V 0 (wA ¡ r (cA)). There exist va < 0 and
vb > 0 such that (i) for 4V 0
A > (<)va an increase in wA leads to an increase (de-
crease) in the equilibrium value of ¿ and a(n) decrease (increase) in the equilibrium
value of nB; and (ii) for 4V 0
A < (>)vb an increase in wA leads to a(n) decrease
(increase) in the equilibrium value of nA. Net of tax income always increases.
In contrast to the redistribution e¤ect, the sign of the participation e¤ect is ambigu-
ous. Participation is determined by the income di¤erential V (wA ¡ ¿)¡V (wA ¡ r(cA)).
If the income di¤erential V (wA ¡ ¿) ¡ V (wA ¡ r(cA)) increases (decreases) with an
increase in income, participation will decrease (increase). Clearly, the income di¤eren-
tial increases if and only if ¿ > r(cA). There is also an indirect e¤ect on participation
through the change in the tax rate.
Now we consider two cases. If ¿ > r(cA) the direct e¤ect of an increase in income
is a decrease in participation. In this case the redistribution e¤ect and the political
in‡uence e¤ect work in the same direction and the tax rate will increase. The e¤ect on
nA is indeterminate: if the increase in the income di¤erential is large enough (larger
than vb > 0) the indirect e¤ect on participation via the increased tax rate outweighs
the direct e¤ect and nA may even increase.
If ¿ < r(cA), the redistribution e¤ect and the (direct) participation e¤ect work
in opposite directions. Only if the (absolute value of the) increase in the income
di¤erential is high enough, the latter will dominate the former and taxes will decrease.
However, nA will always increase. Finally the group size in sector B always moves in
the other direction than the tax rate.
An interesting application concerns the political impact of a declining industrial
sector. With a …xed interest group size (and, thus, …xed political in‡uence weight)
our model would predict a lower tax or higher subsidy for the sector, because of
the redistribution e¤ect. However, the political participation of individuals in this
sector will also be a¤ected. Dependent on the tax levied before the decline sets in
the proposition suggests that this may lead to a larger interest group size, reinforcing
the negative redistribution e¤ect on the sector’s tax, but possibly also to a smaller
size accompanied by a larger instead of smaller tax.
103.4 Behavioral sensitivity
The sensitivity ofindividuals toa gap between actual and reference utility, represented
by the parameter ¯, determines their propensity of joining an interest group. In the
previous section we noted that informational as well as cultural factors may play
a role here. Although such factors are likely to a¤ect all sectors, for generality we
also consider the impact of a sector speci…c parameter (¯i). As should be clear from
eq. (1), the e¤ects of a change in this type of behavioral sensitivity are driven by the
condition whether ¿i is larger or smaller than r(ci). The next proposition summarizes
the e¤ects of a change in ¯A.
Proposition 6 Everything else the same, an increase in the behavioral sensitivity to
a gap between actual and reference utility in sector A (¯A) generates an equilibrium
with smaller (larger) interest groups in both sectors and a higher (lower) tax for sector
A if ¿ < r(cA) (¿ > r (cA)) .
If ¯A increases and actual utility is larger than reference utility (¿A < r(cA)) then
the size of the interest group in sector A decreases (see eq.(1)) inducing a higher tax
for this sector. This leads in turn to a decrease also in the size of the interest group
in sector B. A similar reasoning applies if the alternative condition holds. Results
become more complex in case of a general change in ¯ . The reason is that now ¿B
versus r(cB) also starts to play a role, which leads to more complicated e¤ects on nA
and nB. The results of a general change in behavioral sensitivity (with ¯A = ¯B) are
presented in the following proposition.
Proposition 7 Everything else the same, an across sectors change in behavioral sen-
sitivity (¯) generates an equilibrium with (i) if ¿ < ¡
mA
mBr(cB) an increase in the tax
rate; (ii) if ¡
mA
mBr(cB) < ¿ < r (cA) a decrease in both group sizes and an ambiguous
e¤ect on the tax rate; and (iii) if ¿ > r(cA) a decrease in the tax rate.
To provide some further intuition, note from eq. (2) that on impact both interest
groups become smaller when
¡mB
mA r(cB) < ¿A < r(cA), which explains result (ii).
Outside this interval the e¤ects on nA and nB are ambiguous . The proposition
shows that larger behavioral sensitivity - e.g. due to better information or less inertia
in political participation - can produce very di¤erent outcomes dependent on the size
and distribution of the tax burden.
4 Dynamics
An important issue that we are interested in in this paper concerns the dynamics of
the model consisting of (1) and (2). It is by now well-known that nonlinear dynamical
systems like our model can give rise to complicated dynamical phenomena such as
periodic cycles and irregular ‡uctuations. In fact, periodic and chaotic behavior
11seem to be the rule rather than the exception in many nonlinear dynamical models.
Examples of erratic ‡uctuations arising naturally in economic dynamic models can be
found in the literature on endogenous business cycle theory (e.g. Grandmont 1985,
de Vilder 1996, Tuinstra 2000).
As will be shown in this section, also in the present model equilibria need not
be stable and complicated dynamic patterns may emerge under the slightest pertur-
bation of the parameters of the model. Crucial in this respect are the values of the
political participation parameters ¯ and ¸. Instability arises if, for a given value of
one parameter, the other parameter becomes su¢ciently large. We have the following
general result.
Proposition 8 Consider the model given by eqs. (1) and (2). There exists ¸
f > 0
such that the equilibrium (n¤
A;n¤
B) of the model is locally stable for ¸ < ¸
f and unstable
for ¸ > ¸
f. If ¸
f < 1 a period-doubling bifurcation occurs at ¸ = ¸
f.
At a bifurcation there is a qualitative change of the behavior of the dynamical
system. In particular, at a period doubling bifurcation the locally stable equilibrium
becomes unstable and trajectories of the dynamical system are attracted to a period
two orbit, where fractions keep on ‡uctuating between two values. That is, in even
periods the system is in state (nA;nB) = (nI;nII) whereas in odd periods the system
is in state (nA;nB) = (nIII;nIV ), with nIII 6= nI and nIV 6= nII. More complicated
time series might also obtain. In order to be able to look at the possible dynamical
features of the model in more detail we have to specify the model. With respect to
the indirect utility function, we assume V (x) = 1
1¡®x1¡®; with 0 < ® < 1. The …rst



















Furthermore, we assume that r (ci) = ci and
¤(¯i [V (wi ¡ ¿i) ¡ V (wi ¡ ci)]) =
1
1 + exp¯i [V (wi ¡ ¿i) ¡ V (wi ¡ ci)]
(4)
(see Appendix A).
Moreover, we consider a symmetric version of the model with mA = mB = 1 (thus
ni can be interpreted as the fraction of people organized in sector i), cA = cB = c,
wA = wB = w and ¯A = ¯B = ¯. For this (sector) symmetric model a unique
equilibrium exists with ¿ = 0 and nA = nB = n¤ = 1
1+exp¯[V (w)¡V (w¡c)]. Our stability
result then looks as follows.
Proposition 9 Consider the symmetric model speci…ed above. There exists a ¯
¤ > 0
such that for ¯ < ¯
¤, the symmetric equilibrium (nA;nB) = (n¤;n¤) is locally stable
12for all ¸ 2 (0;1). Furthermore, for ¯ > ¯
¤ the symmetric equilibrium is locally stable
for ¸ < ¸
f and unstable for ¸ > ¸
f, where ¸















w1¡® ¡ (w ¡ c)
1¡®¢¢
. For ¯ > ¯
¤, the system undergoes a period
doubling bifurcation at ¸ = ¸
f. At this period doubling bifurcation a symmetric period






with nI < n¤ < nII, emerges.
To illustrate, we consider some simulations with w = 10, c = 1 and ® = 1
2. For
low values of ¯, that is, when people are not very likely to join or leave an interest
group on the basis of the economic situation, the equilibrium is stable. However, if ¯
su¢ciently increases the equilibrium becomes unstable. This is illustrated in Figure
2. The graph shown in this …gure divides the (¯;¸)-space into a region with stable














B: the bifurcation curve 
C: unstable equilibrium
Figure 2: Regions in the (¯;¸)¡plane with stable and unstable equilibrium and the
bifurcation curve along which a period-2 cycle emerges :

























13We will now …x ¸ = 1
10 and investigate how the dynamics of interest group sizes
and the tax rate evolve as the behavioral sensitivity parameter ¯ varies. For ¸ = 1
10the
period-doubling bifurcation described in Proposition 9 occurs at ¯
f ¼ 3:86. At this
value of ¯ the equilibrium becomes unstable and a period two cycle emerges. For ¯
close to, but larger than ¯
f almost all orbits of the dynamical system are attracted
to this period two cycle.4 The resulting period two cycle corresponds to the situation
where in one period interest group A is ‘large’ and interest group B is ‘small’, and
the latter group is taxed to the bene…t of people in sector A, while in the next period
the situation is reversed. For higher values of ¯ more complicated dynamic patterns
emerge. The panels in Figure 3 illustrate the occurrence of strange attractors and the
corresponding complicated time series for di¤erent values of ¯. The intuition for these
time series is the following. An increase in the size of one of the interest groups leads
to a new tax, which is more bene…cial to this interest group. This leads to an increase
in the size of the other interest group which induces a tax rate more bene…cial to this
interest group. In this fashion the sizes of the interest groups keep on increasing until
the process loses momentum, due to a diminishing e¤ect on the tax schedule, and
is eventually reversed. With larger ¯ the reverse process becomes dominated by the
organizational inertia parameter ¸ which causes the ‘following’ type of behavior in
the decline of the interest groups illustrated by the bottom panel in Figure 3.
Our analysis shows that focusing on equilibria can be very misleading because
they may be unstable and, therefore, extremely unlikely to be obtained. Instead,
complicated dynamics may emerge. Whereas for the symmetric cases examined in
Figure 3 it holds that the patterns are still regular in some sense, more irregular time
series are obtained once asymmetry is allowed. To illustrate, the top panel in Figure
4 shows the dynamics of the model in case that: wA = 4;wB = 10; and ¯ = 10
(keeping ci=wi = 0:1). The left …gure in the bottom panel shows the corresponding
time series for a particular time interval. When compared with the right …gure in this
panel - which reproduces Figure 1 - the resemblance of these two …gures is striking.
By letting one sector represent workers and the other sector owners or managers, it
shows that the internal dynamics of our model alone can generate ‡uctuations in
organizational density that are similar to the unionization of workers in the U.S. that
Figure 1 refers to. No exogenous shocks are needed. Of course, we are not claiming
here that we provide an explanation of this particular historical development. To do
so would require, for instance, to allow for changes in many parameters over time (like
income growth) in an appropriate way. Moreover, as argued by Freeman (1988), the
redistribution con‡ict between workers and managers at the …rm level should then
also be taken into account, which could perhaps be done by linking up our model
with a similar kind of political economic model that would be relevant for the wage
policies of …rms. The only claim we want to make is to have shown in a rigorous way
4Due to symmetry of the dynamical system all orbits with nA0 = nB0 will converge to the
equilibrium, even if it is unstable.
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Figure 3: Top to bottom panels correspond to di¤erent values of ¯ for the symmetric
model with parameters: c = 1, w = 10, m = 1, ® = 0:5 and ¸ = 0:1 The …rst column
shows the time series of the fraction of people organized in sector A (solid-line) and
sector B (dot-line) ; second column shows the time series of tax in sector A; third
column shows the attractors.


















































































Figure 4: Top panel: time series of the fraction of individuals organized in sector
A and of the tax on individuals in that sector for the model with the following
asymmetric parameters: wA = 4, wB = 10, cA=wA = cB=wB = 0:1, mA=mB = 1,
® = 0:5 and ¸ = 0:1. Bottom panel: left …gure shows a fragment from the left …gure
in the top panel, right …gure reproduces Figure 1.
that by integrating ‘top-down’ (policy) and ‘bottom-up’ (behavioral) factors spurts
and declines in the organizational density of interest groups as observed in practice
can be endogenously generated, without any reliance on exogenous shocks.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have presented a dynamic model of endogenous interest group sizes
and policymaking, focusing on redistribution. It integrates ‘top-down’ (policy) and
‘bottom-up’ (behavioral) in‡uences on the development of interest groups. Our model
shows the restrictiveness of, on the one hand, the common assumption of …xed interest
group sizes and, on the other hand, the concentration of attention on equilibria in
the literature. For example, due to the endogeneity of the size of an interest group
an increase in the contribution by its members need no longer induce lower taxes
for (or larger subsidies to) this group, even though it would in case of …xed sizes.
Incidentally, this may help explain the mixed results obtained by empirical political
16economic models using the (relative) numerical strengths of social groups as a proxy
for political in‡uence (see Hettich and Winer 1999, p. 203). Similarly, an increase
in the size of a social group - say, the number of retired - need not lead to smaller
subsidies to individuals of this group; instead, subsidies may even increase because of
an increased interest group size. On the other hand, the dynamic analysis of the model
has shown that reliance on equilibrium results such as these can be very misleading.
The reason is that equilibria may not be stable. For our relatively simple model
we have been able to parameterize in a rigorous way the conditions for instability,
which are related to the behavioral mechanism underlying the development of interest
groups. If these conditions hold, complicated dynamics can emerge. Dependent on
the initial situation very di¤erent time patterns for policy and interest group sizes
show up in that case (path dependency). Moreover, the model can generate by itself -
that is, without the help of any exogenous shocks - the types of spurts and declines in
organizational density that are observed in reality. All in all, the results obtained from
the comparative-statics and dynamic analysis seem interesting and realistic enough
to warrant further theoretical and empirical investigation.
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18Appendix A: microfoundation of interest group model
Assume that there is continuum of individuals in sector i with mass mi. The prob-
ability of joining the interest group in sector i for individual j is determined by the
following di¤erence




where "j is voter j’s individual “preference”or inclination for joining an interestgroup.
This inclination "t is distributed according to a distribution function F. Individual j
will join the interest group if Uij ¸ 0, that is, if
"j ¸ ¯i[V (wi ¡ ¿i) ¡ V (wi ¡ r(ci))]:
Now assume that in each period the individual decides with probability ¸i to recon-
sider his membership. Then the fraction of sector i that organizes becomes
ni;t+1 = (1 ¡ ¸i)ni;t + ¸imi¤(¯i [V (wi ¡ ¿i) ¡ V (wi ¡ r(ci))]); i = A;B:
where
¤(¯i[V (wi ¡ ¿i) ¡ V (wi ¡ r (ci))]) = 1 ¡ F (¯i [V (wi ¡ ¿i) ¡ V (wi ¡ r(ci))]):
If we assume that F is the logistic distribution (see Anderson et al. 1992) we have
¤(¯i [V (wi ¡ ¿i) ¡ V (wi ¡ r(ci))]) =
1
1 + exp(¯i[V (wi ¡ ¿i) ¡ V (wi ¡ r (ci))])
;




B;¿¤) of the model is implicitly de…ned as a solution to


























19where r(ci) 2 [0;wi] is the reservation value with respect to interest group member-
ship and r0 (ci) > 0. The indirect utility function V (y) is positive, monotonically
increasing and strictly concave, i.e. V (y) > 0, V 0 (y) > 0 and V 00 (y) < 0. Fur-
thermore V (0) = 0 and limy!0V 0 (y) = +1. Finally, the participation function
¤(y) 2 (0;1) is decreasing in its argument: ¤0 (y) < 0.
To simplify the notation we introduce the following: ri ´ r(ci), Vir ´ V (wi ¡ r (ci)),






, ¢Vi ´ Vi¿ ¡ Vir, ¤i = ¤(¯i¢Vi) and
derivatives are denoted in a similar fashion. The three equilibrium equations now
reduce to





Let us de…ne the function





The equilibrium value of ¿ corresponds to a zero of f (:). The associated equilibrium
values of nA and nB then follow from the other two equilibrium conditions.
Proof of Proposition 1 (existence and uniqueness of equilibrium)
Firstobserve thatthe assumption limy!0V 0 (y) = +1 implies thatlim¿!¡
mB
mA
wB f (¿) =
¡1 and lim¿!wA f (¿) = 1. Since f is a continuous function on a connected set this


























this equilibrium is unique.¥
Proof of Proposition 2 (comparative statics for …xed interest group sizes)
The equilibrium value of ¿ solves














Di¤erentiating f (¿) with respect to all parameters gives
























































< (>)0 if ¿ > (<)0.¥
Comparative statics – endogenous group sizes
In order to study the comparative statics of the full model we take the total di¤erential
of f with respect to ¿, cA, mA, wA and ¯A. This gives
f¿d¿ + fcAdcA + fmAdmA + fwAdwA + f¯Ad¯A = 0
with f¿ =
@f
@¿ given by (8) and
fcA = mAV
0


































































B¿¿ < 0, BwA = 0 and B¯A = 0:


















This is positive if and only if ¤A + cA¯ ¶ Ar0¤0
AV 0





Ar = c¤ > 0: With respect to nA we …nd
dnA
dcA
















which is negative for r0V 0
Ar ¡ V 0
A¿
d¿
dcA > 0. This inequality can be rewritten as
V
0








2 + cBr0¤BV 00
B¿







and nB therefore moves in the opposite direction of ¿ when cA changes.¥
































We have ¿a < 0 < ¿b < ¿c. The latter inequality follows from the fact that the
numerator of ¿c is larger than the numerator of ¿b whereas the denominator of ¿c is



























































hence nB increases with an increase in mA when d¿
dmA < ¡ ¿
mA which is equivalent with
¿ < ¿b.¥



















which is positive if and only if ¯A¤0
AV 0
A¿4V 0
A + ¤AV 00











Now consider the e¤ect on nA. We have
dnA
dwA
















which is positive when 4V 0





























dwA > 0 if and only if d¿
dwA < 0.¥
















d¯A has the same sign as 4VA and is therefore positive if and only if



























Since the term between brackets is always positive, the sign of
dnA
d¯A is always opposite
the sign of 4VA and d¿











and hence the sign of
dnB
d¯A is opposite to the sign of 4VA and d¿
d¯A.¥
Proof of Proposition 7 (e¤ects of a simultaneous change in ¯A and ¯B).
The next step is to look at some comparative statics when ¯A = ¯B change simulta-















































































































respectively. We then have
241. ¿ < ¡
mA
mBr (cB) (implying 4VA > 0, 4VB < 0). In this regime we have d¿
d¯ > 0







mBr(cB) < ¿ < r(cA) (implying 4VA;4VB > 0). In this regime the sign on
d¿
d¯ is ambiguous and
dnA
d¯ < 0 and
dnB
d¯ < 0.
3. ¿ > r(cA) (implying 4VA < 0, 4VB > 0). In this regime we have d¿






Proof of Proposition 8 (stability of equilibrium).
The dynamic system is given by
nA;t+1 = (1 ¡ ¸)nAt + ¸mA¤(¯A[VA (wA ¡ ¿ (nAt;nBt)) ¡ VB (wB ¡ r(cA))])
nB;t+1 = (1 ¡ ¸)nBt + ¸mB¤(¯B [VB (wB + ¿ (nAt;nBt)mA=mB) ¡ VB (wB ¡ r (cB))])










































A + mAcB¤BV 00
B
> 0
The eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix in (9) are ¹1 = 1 ¡ ¸ and ¹2 = 1 ¡ ¸ ¡




@ni, for i = A;B. The associated eigenvectors are















Notice that 0 · ¹1 · 1 and that the second eigenvalue ¹2 goes through ¡1 when
¸ =
2
































Summarizing, if °A = °B then j¹2j = j¹1j = 1¡¸ < 1 and therefore, the equilibrium
(n¤
A;n¤
B) is locally stable for all ¸ 2 (0;1): If °A 6= °B and ¸
f < 1 then j¹2j < 1
25(j¹2j > 1) for ¸ 2 (0;¸
f) ( ¸ > ¸
f). Therefore, the equilibrium (n¤
A;n¤
B) is locally
stable (unstable) for ¸ 2 (0;¸
f) ( ¸ > ¸
f): A period doubling bifurcation occurs at
¸ = ¸
f since ¹2 = ¡1: If °A 6= °B and ¸
f ¸ 1 then the equilibrium (n¤
A;n¤
B) is
locally stable for all ¸ 2 (0;1)( for the theory on period doubling bifurcations see e.g.
Kuznetsov 1995).¥
Proof of Proposition 9 (stability of equilibrium in the symmetric speci…ed
model).
We use the above proof for the symmetric speci…ed model with wA = wB = w;
mA = mB = 1; ¯A = ¯B = ¯ and cA = cB = c. For this case, the eigenvalues are
¹1 = 1¡¸ 2 (0;1) with eigenvector v1 =
¡
1 1




¢0 ; where ° ´ ¯
¤0(¯¢V )(V 0(w))2
¤(¯¢V )V 00(w) . A period doubling bifurcation occurs at
¸
f = 2
¤(¯¢V )V 00 (w)
¤(¯¢V )V 00 (w) + ¯¤0 (¯¢V )(V 0 (w))
2:
For our example we have V (y) = 1


































1¡® ¡ (w ¡ 1)
1¡®¢¶
¡ 1:
Since F (0) = ¡2, lim¯!1 F (¯) = 1 and F 0 (¯) > 0, such a solution exists and is
unique. It is easily checked that for ¯ > ¯
¤ we have ¸
f < 1. Finally, for the numerical
example with w = 10, c = 1 and ® = 1
2 we …nd ¸
f = 2
1+exp(2¯(
p
10¡3))
1+(1+2¯
p
10)exp(2¯(
p
10¡3))and
¯
¤ ¼ 0:3015.¥
26